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Introduction
Major Evolutionary Transitions are often characterised by cooperation and division of
labour on a given level of organisation which leads to the emergence of a higher level of
evolutionary unit [13, 21]. Thus, understanding the evolution of cooperation and division
of labour is of exceptional importance. It is especially so in the case of humans, where
both cooperation and division of labour operates on numerous levels and on a remarkably
large scale. But cooperation of this scale is not only a result of our singular evolutionary
history, but presumably it is also among the primary causes of the unusual success of the
Homo sapiens (see e.g. [4] or [11]). As all this was realised many decades ago, an immense
body of literature accumulated in this research field. To give an idea about the wide range
of the literature, on March 08 2018 the Web of Science found 24 531 titles including the
term “cooperation”, and 2287 titles including “division of labour”. Yet, however extensive
this literature is, it still cannot cover all the appearing questions in connection with such
a complex problem. In my thesis I attempt to answer a number of untackled questions
regarding the emergence and evolutionary role of cooperation and division of labour in
structured populations, with special emphasis on human social groups. In my thesis I
discuss three studies investigating different, but related problems, as follows:
1. How can cooperation invade variously viscous populations in characteristically dif-
ferent social situations?
2. How does division of labour emerge during cooperative task solving in social groups,
and what are the evolutionary consequences?
3. How does food production and sedentism effect the appearance of division of labour
and specialisation in human social groups?
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Cooperation in the Volunteer’s Dilemma Game
When studying the evolution of cooperation, two main questions arise: (i) whether coop-
eration can be evolutionarily stable, and (ii) whether it can spread when appearing as a
rare mutant strategy [2]. For explaining the evolution of cooperation we have to find the
answers to both of these questions. In the first study I ask how cooperators, as rare mu-
tants, can invade a population of cheaters in characteristically different social dilemmas,
that is, situations in which collective and private interest conflict with each other.
I compare two types of N -person social dilemmas, the most frequently studied N -
person Prisoner’s Dilemma (NPD) [10] and the less well-known, but biologically more
adequate Volunteer’s Dilemma (VD) games [1]. The difference between these two games
is how the number of cooperators affects the benefit they provide their group with: while
in the NPD the benefit increases linearly with the number of cooperators, the VD is char-
acterised by a step function (see Fig. 1). Since many social situations are characterised
by typically non-linear benefit functions (see e.g. [17] or [12]), the VD appears to be a
better model to describe natural systems.
Figure 1: Schematic picture of the different benefit functions. A gen-
eral saturating non-linear benefit function (dashed line), the linear NPD
(dotted line) and the VD (continuous line).
In infinite, well-mixed populations of the NPD, cooperation disappears unless there
is positive assortment or relatedness between cooperators [16]. In the VD, there is a
parameter range, where a stable coexistence of cooperators and defectors is possible.
However, even if coexistence is possible, the problem of how the rare mutant strategy can
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spread remains a problem in both games.
In this study, I was concerned with the likelihood of rare cooperators invading popu-
lations dominated by defection. I used models of cellular automata in which individuals
played stochastic NPD and VD games, or a general saturating non-linear N -person game.
I also studied the role of dispersal (or viscosity).
I considered a toroidal square lattice grid of L2 (generally 100x100) nodes with at
most one individual per grid point. Every individual interacted with its eight nearest
neighbours. The modelled population was asexual with overlapping generations. I ex-
amined the effect of viscosity throughout three different settings: (i) The highly viscous
case, in which there is no dispersal. (ii) The well-mixed case, in which each cycle is fol-
lowed by an exchange of every individual with a randomly chosen other one. (iii) The
variable mixing case, in which each cycle is followed by a given number of mixing steps,
when two randomly chosen neighboring individuals change their position. In the invasion
experiments, I modified the initial ratio of cooperators on a continuum from 1/L2 to 0.4.
I measured the probability of a successful invasion as a function of the intial frequency of
cooperators. Finally, I examined the role of the population size, using alternative grids
with sizes varying between 50x50 and 250x250 grid points. With the help of the model I
described above, I have got the following results.
• 1.1 I have shown that in the VD, unlike the NPD, the coexistence of cooperators
and defectors is typical. Furthermore, the game with the general saturating benefit
function is characteristically different from the NPD, but similar to the VD.
• 1.2 In agreement with the replicator dynamics of the VD, the invasion of cooperators
in a well-mixed population is only possible if their initial concentration exceeds a
critical threshold.
• 1.3 In a viscous population, I have found that instead of the initial concentration,
the initial number determines the success of invasion. In this case, even a single
mutant cooperator can invade with a high probability, because the local density of
cooperators exceeds the critical threshold.
VA´SA´RHELYI, ZS & SCHEURING, I Invasion of cooperators in lattice popula-
tions: Linear and non-linear public good games. BioSystems, 113(2):81–90,
2013.
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Division of labour in a collective task
Behavioural differences among conspecifics of the same population have been reported
from all kinds of living organisms, from bacteria to vertebrates, including humans [7, 8,
20, 9, 6]. Interestingly, the adaptive value of individual variation in animal personality,
especially in humans, is still the subject of debate [19, 14]. There are several approaches
to explaining the ultimate causes of human and animal personality variation (see e.g.
Wolf et al. [22], Nettle [15], or Bergmu¨ller and Taborsky [3]), however, the possibility that
selection for cooperation can also play a role in causing or maintaining this diversity, had
not yet received proper attention.
I propose that division of labour (DL) between socially related conspecifics can cause
and maintain variation in behaviour through negative frequency dependent selection that
continuously decreases a phenotype’s benefit as its frequency increases. Selection thus
creates diversity, by favouring the rare, acting on preferences and skills, that is, on per-
sonality traits. In the second study I analysed a strategic model that studied the effect
of DL on heritable behavioural differences.
I considered a large well-mixed population, where members of small groups solve
a collective task. Solving this task produces a common good for the group which is
distributed among the members after performing the task. Individuals can choose between
two kinds of subtasks, before entering a group. The abilities to perform the two subtasks
are not independent, and are in negative trade-off. Individuals are characterised by two
heritable traits: the probability of choosing the subtasks, and the cost assigned to these.
The population is asexual, and occasional mutations occur in both traits. I consider two
different benefit sharing systems. In the first, sharing is equal. In the second, the sharing
is frequency dependent: those who chose the scarcer subtask, get more. My main interest
is whether DL emerges as a result of an evolutionary branching into two subpopulations
specialised for the two subtasks.
A mathematical analysis of this model revealed two numerically testable predictions.
(i) If the trade-off is convex betwen the costs, DL is likely to appear in the population,
especially with the unequal benefit sharing system. (ii) The homogeneous population
specialised to one of the subtasks is in a stable state, that is, in such a population DL will
never appear. I have tested these predictions numerically, and studied a further extension
with social control and varying population sizes, too. By social control I meant that there
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Figure 2: The impact of the initial trait values on branching. The plot
shows two runs of 104 generations from different initial states.
is a social pressure on every individual not to get specialised, or more practically, to carry
out both subtasks with nonzero probability. My main results are as follows.
• 2.1 I have shown that SDL and specialisation can emerge in a population frequently
facing a collective task, especially with a convex trade-off between the costs of
different subtasks.
• 2.2 SDL and specialisation proved to be much more probable in the case of a benefit
sharing system that takes into account the individual’s relative value to its group.
• 2.3 The numerical model confirmed that though the local mathematical analysis can
predict the global behaviour, in the case of rare mutant strategies, the population
never reaches the branching point, where specialisation could appear (see Fig. 2).
• 2.4 Finally, I have shown that branching is seriously hindered by both social control
and a small population size in the model.
VA´SA´RHELYI, ZS, MESZE´NA, G & SCHEURING, I Evolution of heritable be-
havioural differences in a model of social division of labour. PeerJ, page 977,
2015.
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Food production and behavioural diversity
Agriculture and sedentary life changed human societies immensely. The most striking
features of typical pre-agricultural societies include the absence of leadership, strong hi-
erarchy, and permanent homes [5], all of which are present in post-agricultural societies.
The third study is concerned with two further outcomes of food production: food storage
and social division of labour (SDL), DL within sex and age groups.
In this study I discussed an individual based model that attempts to study the con-
nections between the appearance of food production, human social division of labour and
behavioural diversity. I have two main settings representing different social and ecological
environments: the ones before, and after the adoption of agriculture.
I consider a sexually reproducing, well-mixed group. In each time frame, individuals
choose between NT ≥ 2 different tasks, and they spend their time with that particular
task or activity. Being engaged in a task increases the payoff of the actor but tasks
differ in the sense that they require and improve different skills. When someone spent a
round with task j, this will not only gain her payoff, but also improve her effectiveness
in solving task j. Individuals increase their expertise in one or more tasks during their
lifetime. The more someone chooses a task, the more her expertise will grow in it, but
the limit and speed of this increase depends on genetic factors. An individual’s genetics
consists of a quantitative genetic background (talent or affinity) for each task. I imagine
this talent or affinity to be coded by a large number of genes, similarly to how personality
or behavioural traits are coded by numerous genes [18].
At the end of each round payoffs are assigned to individuals according to their expertise
in that round’s task. Occasionally, individuals have a choice to update their task choice
strategy by imitating others. The purpose of such imitation is to copy successful strategies,
but we assume that one is only willing to copy a strategy that is not too different from
her own. At the end of a generation’s time (that includes a number of imitation phases,
too), individuals are assigned into pairs and sexual reproduction takes place.
I have examined the above model framework with two different fitness calculating
procedures, the pre-Neolithic or subsistence, and the Neolithic or producer case. In the
subsistence setting, because of the special ecological environment, individuals are better
off when they have some expertise in all activities. In the producer setting, having a
general knowledge or experience is no longer a necessity, individuals are free to specialise.
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Figure 3: Summary of the basic results in both settings. The figure
shows the task choice probabilities (top row) and the distribution of the
genetics (bottom row) for one task throughout all generations. Greenish
colours represent the subsistence, reddish the producer case.
I have studied both settings with 2, 3 and 4 tasks. I have also studied the effect of
the group size, the role of frequency dependence and the strength of assortativity during
imitation and reproduction. My main results are as follows.
• 3.1 When food storage and/or trade becomes available, behavioural specialisation
and large-scale division of labour is likely to appear (see Fig. 3).
• 3.2 I have shown that in the producer case both phenotypic and genetic specialisa-
tion is possible, if scarcer goods are more valuable.
• 3.3 As the number of tasks increase, an ever larger group is necessary for speciali-
sation.
• 3.4 Although phenotypic specialisation is often present, genetic specialisation re-
quires strong assortativity both during imitation and mate choice.
VA´SA´RHELYI, ZS & SCHEURING ,I Behavioural specialisation during the ne-
olithic – An evolutionary model. Submitted
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